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Abstract    
In this paper, we analyze the visions presented by stakeholders and the emerging strategies 
of EU Member States to achieve a low-carbon energy system by 2050. We identify the key 
challenges in the six energy policy areas, i.e. energy efficiency, greenhouse gas emissions, 
renewable energy, energy infrastructure, energy market, and technology innovation and 
R&D. We also find that Member States are already pursuing different strategies to deal with 
these challenges. This creates new risks for energy policy fragmentation, but it also implies 
new opportunities for Member States to cooperate, and for the EU institutions to provide 
added value to national policies.  
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Introduction  
In 2009, the European Council conclusions called upon all parties to embrace the objective of 
the International Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) to limit climate change to 2°C in 2050 by 
drastically reducing greenhouse gas emissions.i The target for developed countries is 
considered to be a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) of 80 to 95% below 1990 
levels by 2050. In 2011, the European Council asked for an elaboration of a 2050 low-carbon 
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strategy.ii The European Commission responded shortly after by releasing three roadmaps 
throughout 2011, and as a result, the transition towards a low-carbon energy future is 
increasingly debated in Europe.iii 
It is in this context that several EU Member States started to develop a 2050 energy strategy, 
and that stakeholders have presented their vision for Europe. The strategies we discuss in 
this paper are from France, Germany and the UK. The visions we analyze are from a diverse 
set of stakeholders that have been published in 2010: a European electricity industry 
association (Eurelectric: “Power Choices – Pathways to carbon-neutral electricity in Europe 
by 2050), representatives of the European gas industry (EGAF: Making the green journey 
work – Optimized pathways to reach 2050 abatement targets with lower costs and improved 
feasibility), the European Climate Foundation (ECF: Roadmap 2050 – A practical guide to a 
prosperous low-carbon Europe), the intergovernmental International Energy Agency (IEA: 
Energy Technology Perspectives 2010 – BLUE Map Scenario to 2050) and a non-
governmental environmental organization in cooperation with an association of the 
renewable energy industry (EREC/Greenpeace: Energy [R]evolution – A sustainable world 
energy outlook).  
The paper is organized into 3 sections. Section 1 discusses the transition costs and benefits. 
Section 2 analyzes the stakeholder visions and derives from these visions the main policy 
challenges. Section 2 then looks at how France, Germany and the UK are already dealing 
with these challenges. We identify the actual risks of policy fragmentation and the new 
opportunities for Member State cooperation and European added value.  
1. The transition costs and benefits 
Stakeholders have presented alternative pathways towards a low carbon energy system in 
2050 with slightly different geographic scopesiv and GHG emission reduction targets. In what 
follows, we discuss the differences in assumptions regarding: 1) fuel prices; and 2) 
technology development. 
For the assumed fuel prices, IEA presents low fuel prices, based on the reference scenario of 
the IEA World Energy Outlook. It is assumed that fuel prices will decrease significantly 
towards 2050 as a result of the decreasing fuel consumption. ECF fuel prices are slightly 
higher, based on the low carbon scenario included in IEA World Energy Outlook. EGAF uses 
the same assumptions on fuel prices as ECF, except for gas where two scenarios are 
considered: a high gas price scenario with the same gas prices as ECF and a low gas price 
scenario which assumes that gas price remains low up to 2050. The Eurelectric fuel prices, 
based on own calculations, are higher than in the reports above. EREC/Greenpeace has the 
highest assumed fuel prices based on the high price sensitivity scenario in IEA World Energy 
Outlook.  
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Looking at the assumed technology developments, stakeholders do not count on the same 
technologies. For instance, IEA projects that Carbon Capture Transport and Storage (CCTS) 
will be available between 2015 and 2025, depending on the support that this technology will 
receive, ECF considers that CCTS technologies will be commercially available from 2020, 
Eurelectric considers these technologies from 2025, and EGAF from 2030. EREC/Greenpeace 
does not rely on CCTS technologies. The costs of renewable energy technologies are 
assumed to reduce in each scenario, but the reduction is reported in different indicators. For 
instance, Eurelectric presents levelized cost, EREC/Greenpeace refers to the evolution of 
investment and operation and maintenance costs, while IEA, ECF and EGAF report the 
learning rates of the different technologies. 
Despite the differences in the assumptions among the different visions, their outcomes 
concerning the overall cost of the transition are considerably similar. The transition increases 
the need for investments so that capital costs increase, while fuel costs decrease. In 
Eurelectric’s vision, the fuel cost savings do not fully compensate the additional investment 
needed, compared to their baseline scenario. In the IEA’s vision, the additional investments 
are lower than the cumulative fuel savings, compared to their baseline scenario. In ECF’s 
vision, the cost of energy is reported to decline by 20-30% over the total period. EGAF 
however argues that the ECF pathways are costlier and riskier than accounted for. The 
EREC/Greenpeace study reports an annual cost of electricity supply that is below their 
baseline scenario. In other words, the visions agree that investment will go up, and fuel costs 
will come down, but they do not agree on the net effect.v 
Some stakeholders have also argued that their findings are robust by showing that they also 
hold under different assumptions. For instance, Eurelectric performed four sensitivity 
analyses in order to study the impact of changing their main assumptions, including the 
delay on CCTS technologies development, a change in nuclear phase out policies, stricter 
restrictions regarding on-shore wind installation and the inexistence of additional energy 
efficiency policies. The overall result is that in general there are no significant changes, 
neither on the target achieved nor in the overall costs of the transition. IEA also performed 
sensitivity analysis regarding assumptions in the different economic sectors (electricity, 
buildings, industry and transports) in order to guarantee the robustness of their conclusions. 
The main goal of the ECF sensitivity analysis has been to show that the power system can 
sustain a high share of renewable energy sources, even when considering extreme weather 
conditions and/or reductions on interconnections. 
2. Energy policy challenges for 2050 
In this section, we identify the key challenges for the six energy policy areas, i.e. energy 
efficiency, greenhouse gas emissions, renewable energy, energy infrastructure, energy 
market, and technology innovation and R&D. 
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First, the policy area of energy efficiency. The key challenge reported by stakeholders is to 
achieve ambitious energy savings. The comparability of the visions is however limited 
because they do not use the same indicators for savings. Eurelectric and EREC/Greenpeace, 
for instance, report primary energy savings relative to the reference scenario in IEA world 
energy outlook, i.e. 20% for and 40%, respectively. IEA and ECF express energy savings as 
GHG emissions’ reductions, which is 30% in the case of IEA, while in the case of ECF this is 
45% for buildings and 20% for transport. 
Second, the policy area of GHG emissions. The key challenge reported by stakeholders is to 
achieve a nearly zero-carbon electricity sector. The vision is to generate electricity mainly 
from low-carbon energy technologies, i.e. using renewable energy sources, nuclear and/or 
fossil fuels equipped with carbon capture transport and storage (CCTS) so that electricity can 
play an important role in decreasing also the emissions of the transport and heating sectors. 
Eurelectric considers the highest level of electrification for both sectors, followed by the ECF 
vision, while EREC/Greenpeace and IEA consider a higher direct use of renewable energy 
sources and a lower use of electricity. In the EGAF vision, a major contribution comes from 
shifting from coal to gas power plants with also an increased penetration of renewable 
technologies and the application of combined cycles to biomass power plants.  
Third, the policy area of renewable energy. The key challenge reported by stakeholders is to 
achieve the ambitious renewable energy targets. There is an agreement that the use of 
renewable energy sources needs to continue to increase, both directly and indirectly. 
Renewable energy is projected to account for 30-34% (EGAF) up to almost 100% 
(EREC/Greenpeace) of electricity generation in 2050. ECF presents three different visions 
with different shares on the use of renewable sources within the electricity sector, ranging 
from 40% to 80%. IEA envisages that 50% of the electricity is produced from renewable 
energy sources. EGAF suggests postponing the main increase of renewables until 2030. 
Fourth, the policy area of energy infrastructure. The key challenge reported by stakeholders 
is to ensure electricity grid adequacy. The importance of the electricity grid, and especially 
the expansion of transmission across borders, is emphasized in all visions. The expansion of 
interconnections that needs to be achieved ranges from a 40% to almost 400% increase 
compared to today’s capacities in the most extreme scenarios of ECF with 80% renewable 
energy without improvement of demand side flexibility. ECF also shows the potential 
benefits of using demand flexibility to reduce the need for transmission expansion, and 
EREC/Greenpeace advocates for a EU super-grid. 
Fifth, the policy area of the internal energy market. The key challenge reported by almost all 
stakeholders is to ensure electricity supply security. Depending on the visions, the increase 
in generation capacity ranges from 50% (Eurelectric) to 164% (ECF 80% RES) of today’s 
generation capacity. This raises concerns for timely investments, which is especially the case 
for investments in system flexibility. As the amount of back-up capacity that will be needed 
is uncertain, depending on the generation mix and the electricity transmission grid 
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expansion, there are concerns that the market will not deliver in time or will not provide 
enough system flexibility.  
Sixth, the policy area of technology innovation and R&D. The key challenge that is implicit in 
all the visions is to develop the technologies that are not yet available, and to reduce the 
costs of technologies that are already available. Indeed, technology innovation is required to 
address the challenges in the other policy areas: achievement of highly ambitious savings 
requires the use of technologies which are still not commercially available; the almost full 
decarbonisation of the electricity sector strongly relies on improved renewable energy 
technologies and the development of CCTS technologies; and research on smart grids.  
3. Strategies to deal with the key 2050 energy policy challenges 
In this section, we analyze the strategies that are emerging at EU Member State level to deal 
with the key challenges that have been identified in the previous section. We focus on 
France,vi Germanyvii and the UKviii, illustrating new risks for policy fragmentation, and new 
opportunities for cooperation among Member States, and for the EU institutions to provide 
added value to national policies. 
To achieve ambitious energy savings (i.e. key challenge for the energy efficiency policy area), 
France, Germany, and the UK see a lot of potential in their building sectors. In France, the 
target is to achieve a 38% reduction of the overall energy consumption within the building 
sector by 2020. In order to achieve this, they intend to develop stricter building regulations 
for both new and refurbished buildings, defining minimum performance standards and 
minimum annual refurbishment rates. In Germany, the target is to reduce the overall energy 
consumption by 20% by 2020 and by 50% by 2050 relative to 2008 levels. A special fund has 
been established to subsidize a wide range of energy saving measures for consumers, 
industries and local communities, and stricter building regulations for both new and existing 
buildings will be developed. In the UK, the government launched the “Green Deal”, a plan to 
provide up-front financing of energy efficiency improvements that the consumer pays back 
through their energy bills. In other words, we do see that the building sector is strongly 
targeted by low-carbon energy policies at member state level, but the approaches seem to 
diverge substantially. 
Regarding the decarbonisation of the electricity sector (i.e. key challenge for the GHG 
emissions policy area), France, Germany, and the UK have in common that they only 
consider low-carbon technologies for 2050, but the views regarding their relative 
importance diverge widely. In Germany (after the Fukushima accident), nuclear is not an 
option anymore, instead, gas is expected to play an important role during the transition 
towards renewable energy. In France, nuclear remains an important technology, which in 
combination with the 2020 target to achieve 20% renewable energy, implies that the French 
electricity system will be almost decarbonized by 2020. In the UK, the government wants to 
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push CCTS, and also nuclear is still considered as a valid low-carbon option. In other words, 
there are diverging strategies in terms of generation mix, and a first illustration of policy 
fragmentation is the decision of the UK government to introduce a carbon floor for 
electricity generation from 2013. 
Concerning the achievement of the ambitious renewable energy levels (i.e. key challenge 
identified for the renewable energy policy area), especially Germany wants to continue to 
push these technologies beyond 2020. The original Energiekonzept strategy aims to have 
renewable energy for 50% of the electricity consumed in 2030, going up to 65% in 2040, and 
80% in 2050, but these numbers might change now that nuclear will not anymore be the 
bridging technology in Germany. In any case, the Germany strategy relies on the national 
support scheme to push its strategic renewable energy technologies. In the UK, renewable 
energy technologies will be supported, but without targets because the intension is to also 
support the alternatives CCTS and nuclear. In other words, also regarding renewable energy 
policies, there are new risks of policy fragmentation. 
Regarding electricity grid adequacy (i.e. key challenge for the energy infrastructure policy 
area), important actions are foreseen in Germany and the UK. The German strategy is to 
develop the national grid to connect offshore wind farms, deploy smart meters, and to 
integrate national grids into an EU-grid. In the UK, the mandate of the regulator has been 
redefined, to also include taking care of future consumers by supporting the transition 
towards a low-carbon energy system. The regulator has already designed a new regulatory 
regime for grids to allow grid companies to develop the grid that is needed to enable the 
decarbonization of the electricity system. In other words, there are new opportunities to 
cooperate, as there seems to be a willingness to further integrate national transmission 
grids. 
To ensure electricity supply security (i.e. key challenge for the internal energy market policy 
area), there are different strategies. The German strategy is to support integration of the 
electricity (and gas) markets. In France and the UK, the ongoing market reform process risks 
to be a step back in the ongoing integration process. In both markets, the intension is to 
develop a national generation capacity mechanism. In the UK, tendering is also considered 
as a possible alternative to mitigate the security of supply risk, which would be more 
compatible with the current European market framework. The cases of France and the UK 
illustrate that generation capacity mechanisms are increasingly considered at member state 
level, and because these mechanisms are currently national in scope, there is a new risk of 
electricity market fragmentation in Europe. 
Regarding technology development (i.e. the key challenge for the technology innovation and 
R&D policy area), action is considered at national as well as at EU level. In France, public 
funding for the R&D in the energy sector has always been largely focused on nuclear energy. 
Following the Grenelle debate, the French government has decided to allocate more than a 
billion Euros up to 2012 in research for energy efficiency, low carbon transportation, 
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renewable energy and CCTS. In Germany, the focus is on renewable energy, energy 
efficiency and energy storage. In the UK, the Department of Energy and Climate Change is 
supporting low carbon energy research in general, and it is funding demonstration and pre-
commercial deployment projects via the Environmental Transformation Fund and the Low 
Carbon Investment Funding. 
Conclusion 
The studies by stakeholders show different visions of a low carbon energy system in 2050. 
However, they agree on the challenges regarding the six energy-related policy areas to 
achieve these visions: 1) energy efficiency - to achieve ambitious energy savings; 2) 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions - to go towards a nearly zero-carbon electricity sector; 3) 
renewable energy - to achieve an ambitious renewable energy technologies penetration 
level; 4) energy infrastructure - to ensure electricity grid adequacy through the expansion 
and smartening of the grid; 5) internal energy market - to ensure electricity supply security 
through timely investments and system flexibility; and 6) technology innovation and R&D - 
to guarantee sufficient technology development for the achievement of the previous 
challenges.  
As we have illustrated with the 2050 low-carbon energy strategies that are emerging in 
France, Germany, and the UK, there are new risks of policy fragmentation, but also new 
opportunities for cooperation among member states and for the EU institutions to provide 
added value to national policies. The main risks for policy fragmentation that we identified 
are the UK government decision to introduce a national carbon price floor for electricity 
generation from 2013 onwards; and the possible introduction of purely national generation 
capacity mechanisms to address the security of electricity supply concerns in France and in 
the UK. We however also see new opportunities for cooperation among Member States, 
such as the apparent will of Germany and the UK, to further integrate their electricity 
transmission grid to enable their low-carbon energy strategies.  
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corresponding to the “Energiekonzept” was supposed to be voted in 2011, but after the recent events in Japan, 
Germany is reconsidering its strategy.   
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